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Abstract
This is an investigation of the activity detected on three honeypots that utilise the Kippo SSH
honeypot system on VPS servers all on the same C class address. The systems ran on identical
softwarebasesandhardwareconfigurations.Theresultsareovertheperiod21stMarch2013until
Tuesday04June2013.Theinitialanalysiscoveredinthispaperexaminesbehavioursandpatterns
detected of the attacking entities. The attack patterns were not consistent and there was large
disparityinnumbersandmagnitudeofattacksonallhosts.Someoftheseissuesareexploredinthe
paper.
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INTRODUCTION
This is an investigation of the activity detected on three honeypots that utilise the Kippo SSH
honeypot system(Tamminen 2013) on VPS servers. The three honeypots were all configured
identicallyallusing Ubuntu11serverastheoperatingsystem,identicalhardwareintermsofCPU
memory and hard disk. The three honeypots were all deployed across the same IP version 4 /24
subnetwork space a /24 on virtual private servers (VPS). The three honeypots are referred to as
Mopoke(.13),Quokka(.234)andLair(.78);theyareeachconfiguredonaVPS.Thispaperispartof
anongoinginvestigationintoSSHhoneypotsandbuildsonexperimentationandinitialworkdonein
2012(Valli2012).

TheaimofthisinvestigationwastoseekanunderstandingofthethreatsagainstSSHservices.

OVERVIEWOFTHESSHHONEYPOTDESIGNANDSYSTEMDESIGN
Akippo SSH honeypotis amediuminteractionhoneypot .Thisimpliesthat the honeypotimitates
somefunctionsthatareexhibitedbya‘real’system(StevensandPohl2004,Tamminen2013).An
exampleofafunctionalitythatisimitatedisSSH(SecureShell).SSHisdesignedtosecurelytransmit
datausingapointtopointencryptiontunnel(Ciampa2010).KippohoneypotscollectdatafromSSH
serviceattacks(Code.google.com2012).Anopensource,pythonbasedeventdrivenprogramcalled
Twistedlibraries(TwistedMatrixLabs2013)isdeployedtoduplicateaSSHsession.

The basic Ubuntu install then had the latest repository code for Kippo installed from
kippo.googlecode.com Wiki. The servers were setup according to the guide from BruteForce Labs
utilisingtheauthbinddaemon(Koniaris2011).

Themysqldatabasesuitewassuitablyconfigured,securedandusedtorecordallinteractionsfrom
the kippo honeypot on each of the servers, locally. The mysql database structure is expressed in
Table1.

TABLEinput
TABLEauth
idint(11)NOTNULLPK
idint(11)PK,
sessionchar(32)NOTNULL,
sessionchar(32)NOTNULL,
timestampdatetimeNOTNULL,
successtinyint(1)NOTNULL,
usernamevarchar(100)NOTNULL, realmvarchar(50)defaultNULL,
passwordvarchar(100)NOTNULL, successtinyint(1)defaultNULL,
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timestampdatetimeNOTNULL,

inputtextNOTNULL,
KEYsession
(session,timestamp,realm)

TABLEclients
idint(4)PK
versionvarchar(50)NOTNULL

TABLEsensors
idint(11)NOTNULL(PK)
ipvarchar(15)NOTNULL

TABLEsessions
idchar(32)NOTNULLPK
starttimedatetimeNOTNULL,
endtimedatetimedefaultNULL,
sensorint(4)NOTNULL,
ipvarchar(15)NOTNULLdefault'',
termsizevarchar(7)defaultNULL,
clientint(4)defaultNULL,
KEYstarttime(starttime,sensor)

TABLEttylog
idint(11)NOTNULLPK
sessionchar(32)NOTNULL
ttylogmediumblobNOTNULL

Table2MysqlDatabaseStuctureForKippoHoneypot


Thedatabasestructureallowsforthecompleteloggingofallactivityonthehoneypotthatrelatesto
activitygeneratedbyanattacker.InadditionthePostgresqlSQLserverpythonmoduleswereadded
to the Kippo SSH honeypot and all of the servers pushed their data to a centralised server. The
centralisedserverisutilisingtheSURFnetIDS(Surfnet2013)loggingserverSQLdatabaseschemafor
storingthedatafromthehoneypots.

TheKippohoneypotisintendedtobealowinteractionSSHbasedhoneypot.Ithasadictionaryof
bothdefaultandcommonlyusedsystemloginpasswordsthatitusestopresentaweaklyconfigured
systemtotheattacker.ThesystememulatesaSSHsessionviatheuseofthepythonbasedtwisted
libraries to emulate cryptographic functionality that would be found in a normal SSH session
initiation.

Kippo allows an attacking entity to attempt a login to the system believing it is entering into a
legitimate SSH session with the server. Upon successful guessing of the password the attacker is
thenmovedintoafakesystemwithwhichtheycaninteractwith.Inthisfakesystemallinteractions
with the shell are monitored and recorded. The system also allows the use of wget and other
commandscommonlyusedtofetchordownloadfiles,andmanipulateitonthe“compromisedhost”
aswellasabasesetofutilities.Inessencethrougheffectivemimicryitisabletoallowanattackerto
loginandinteractwithwhattheythinkisrealcompromisedhost.Itshouldalsobenotedthatthere
areinconsistenciesinhowthefakesystemispresentedandthatanintelligentagentorhumanactor
shouldquicklyresolvethattheyareinahoneypot.

ItshouldbenotedthattheMetasploitsuitehadamodulethatdidreliablydetectaKipposession
due to issues in initiation of the faked encrypted session using the twisted module in python
(Code.google.com, 2012). This problem has now been fixed in the current version of Kippo. This
issue when active would have alerted automated attackers to the fact that they had probed a
honeypot.

KNOWNATTACKMETHODS
Theprevailingmodusoperandiistheuseofbothbruteforceanddictionarybasedmethodstotry
andguesstheloginandpasswordfortheservers.Bruteforceattacksattempttofindapasswordby
startingwithasinglealphanumericcharacterandcyclingthrougheverypossiblecharacter,number
and non alphanumeric character sequentially, increasing by one additional character as each
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previouspasswordlengthisexhausted.Suchanattackissignificantlytimeconsuming,andislimited
by factors such as bandwidth and the length and complexity of the password will significantly
increasethetimerequired.Unlessthepasswordisquiteashort,andonlyuseslowercaseletters,for
example,abruteforceattackwouldsimplybeunviable.Forthesereasons,thistypeofattackisnow
frequentlylimitedtoofflineattacks,andemployshighspeedcrackingsoftwareandhardwaresuch
asGPGPUbasedsystems.
The dictionary based or list based methods use words or wordlists that simply try one password
aftertheotherblindlyagainstthevictimaccountonthetargetsystem.Thespeedofthesemethods
is typically restricted by the available network bandwidth to the target system. In addition to
network speed the target system's ability to cope with multiple connections before a denial of
service occurs as a result of CPU exhaustion is also a constraint. On some systems where
countermeasuresexistthesystemmayreactandthenshutdownfurtherconnections.

Theselistswilltypicallyuseadictionaryword,knowndefaultpassword(suchasadmin)orcommon
password strings from a keyboard pattern such as qwerty123456 or combinations thereof.
Customisationofthesewordlistsiscommon,andtherearenumeratecustomisedwordlistsavailable
for download on the Internet. Dictionary based methods are highly effective at compromising
defaultinstallationsonanynumberofnetworkenableddevicesandsystemsorsystemthatutilise
poorpasswordsthatfitthispattern.

Detectionof automateddictionarybasedattackscanbearelativelysimpletask.Firstly,wordsare
sometimes sorted sequentially A to Z or Z to A and attempted in this fashion. Chronology and
magnitudeoftheattemptstocompromisetheaccountareindicatorsofbruteforceattack.Astrong
indicator is the intervals between retry of password for example timing that it is not humanly
possible to achieve. Another indicator is the intervals of a login retry that are chronologically
consistentfromthesamehostormultiplehostsasagroupconnecting.

The other attack against an SSH server of course is one that utilises vulnerability whether that be
knownorunknown(zeroday)tocauseeitherprivilegeescalationordenialofservice.Itshouldbe
notedthatwhileKippoisahoneypotitisnotmeanttoprovideemulationatthislevel.However,the
honeypots are configured with full packet capture allowing post incident analysis for this type of
attack.Analysisviafullpacketcaptureisnotacurrentfocusofthisresearchhowever.

ATTACK OUTCOMES AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERED FROM THREE
HONEYPOTS

The period of coverage for this research was from 21st March 2013 until Tuesday 04 Jun 2013, a
periodof75days.Thethreehostshaveallproducedthreeverydifferentsetsofdata.Thisoutcome
issomewhatincongruousgiventhatallofthehostsarefromthesameCclassnetwork.Thehosts
areMopokeXXX.XXX.XXX.13,LairXXX.XXX.XXX.78andQuokkaXXX.XXX.XXX.234.Allofthehostsrun
thesamerevisionsofsoftwareforthebasesystemsandrespectiveoperatingsystems.Theyareall
on identical network links in terms of latency and other critical factors. As best can occur in a
networkedITsystemtheyareidentical. 

Overall during the period examined the hosts sustained the following login attempts Mopoke
210,586,Lair68,417,Quokka12,770totheirrespectivehoneypots.ThenumbersofdistinctIPsper
hostareforQuokka174,Lair326andMopokehad999.

Thehoneypotsarefrontloadedwithpasswordsfromvariousknownbaddatabasesthatwillallow
login to the honeypot system to interact with the fake command shell. Successful logins achieved
perhostovertheperiodwereMopoke663or0.314%ofallloginattempts,Lair172or0.251%ofall
loginattemptsandQuokka78or0.610%.
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Top20Attackers
ThefollowingtablerepresentstheattackingIPsdetectedbythethreehosts(Table2).Oneofthe
clearlyidentifiableanomaliesisthatthetopscanninghostsIP176.31.85.59forLair(28565)and
Mopoke(25927)whichwouldbeindicativeofhardscanningofanetworkclass.HoweverforQuokka
therewerenoscansfromthisIPaddressatallrecordedduringtheperiodcovered.Itshouldbealso
notedthatthesescanswerespreadoverthetimeperiodinwhichdatawascollected.

Mopoke

Lair

176.31.85.59

25927

176.31.85.59

223.4.94.69

13322

173.224.221.197

223.4.241.4

10771

74.63.238.68

9507

223.4.171.195

Quokka
28565

94.127.2.85

1605

5310

211.191.168.180

1604

46.105.189.201

4703

188.132.206.233

974

5.9.200.90

3282

121.9.221.102

974

8434

203.93.215.101

2238

211.110.44.113

771

223.4.175.77

6616

94.127.2.85

1605

101.44.1.135

725

59.125.208.244

6097

188.132.206.233

1461

174.140.167.238

603

220.172.107.211

6048

121.9.221.102

974

218.206.117.57

439

201.116.36.180

5777

58.240.17.250

961

74.84.89.106

286

122.158.235.33

4848

114.112.21.15

953

114.80.202.30

275

116.229.239.242

4772

218.206.117.57

854

84.22.32.2

249

223.4.182.71

3535

91.102.16.156

798

31.40.76.183

222

200.214.143.4

3520

166.78.27.149

725

220.161.148.178

216

174.140.167.238

3442

208.115.207.140

627

112.231.23.68

201

188.125.103.177

3211

128.140.1.19

597

124.160.194.27

174

180.168.83.54

3094

220.161.148.178

593

192.157.220.84

169

5.9.200.90

3075

120.101.5.209

546

62.193.192.167

163

223.4.145.38

2888

218.77.178.3

545

63.137.151.184

163

203.69.139.179

2664

59.151.5.236

511

173.208.218.70

161

218.213.234.232

2519

211.191.168.180

449

125.39.8.142
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Table2Top20ConnectingIPsforHosts


Figure 1 shows the spread of hosts probed by the top 20 attacking IPs for each host. Purposeful
bruteforcescanningisindicatedbythescanningofhostsbytheattackingIPwithterminationofthe
numberofactualloginattemptsatequalcount,thisrepresents11%ofallscannedIPs.Thispattern
would be indicative of simplistic brute force scripts. Further, analysis into these login attempts
supportthishypothesisasthepasswordsetsusedwereconsistentacrossthebruteforcedattempts
ontheattackedhosts.
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AttackingIPsprobing
ofavailablehosts
1host
37%

3hosts
33%

2hosts
30%


Figure1–HoneypothostsprobedbyattackingIPs



Geolocationoftheattackspresentsinterestingpatternsofattackinthisparticularresearch,someof
which is in contrast to some of the rhetoric, fear, uncertainty and doubt around cyber security
threats. The general assumption touted in the tabloid press is that attacks are numerous and
predominantly from Chinese based hosts. Whilst there is some truth in these statements, this
researchpresentsevidencewhichcontradictsthisviewpoint(Table3).

1 France 30%
6 USA
4%
11 China 3%
16 Unknown 2%
2 China
7%
7 Poland
4%
12 Mexico 3%
17 Korea
2%
3 China
6%
8 China
4%
13 China 3%
18 USA
2%
4 USA
5%
9 Germany 4%
14 China 3%
19 Turkey
2%
5 China
5%
10 Taiwan
3%
15 China 3%
20 China
2%
Table3–GeolocationofTop20attackingIPsforallhoneypots


ThebiggestattackingsinglesourceIPwasinfactFrancewith30%ofattacksonthisinfrastructure
emanating from the top 20 attackers. China however, did represent 8 of the top 20 attackers
representing25%ofthevolume,butnotethisisstilllessthanFranceoverall.Therewere9nations
involved in the overall attack profile from across the globe, pointing to the global nature of the
problemofcybersecurity.

Attacksassociatedwithpasswordvulnerabilities
Theprimaryandoftenonlydefensivebarrieronsystemsisthatofapassword.Forapasswordtobe
secure it should typically be over 12 characters long and be complex in its construction using a
random combination of letters, digits and punctuation. This complexity would also preclude
dictionary words or simple patterns for example based on a keyboard sequence e.gqwerty or a
sequence of numbers and letters e.g abc123. There is also publicity about passwords that are
insecureandproblematicwithlistsofinsecurepasswordspostedonreputablewebsitesandnews
services(Anonymous2012,Harley2012,King2012)inattemptstoeducateusers.

TheKippohoneypotisoptimisedtousetheselistsofpasswords,soitisnosurpriseinthefollowing
tablethatthesewordscontainedintheaforementionedbadpasswordlistsappearherenumerate
times.
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Mopoke
123456

Lair
7350 123456

1632

Quokka
123456

password

6204 password

803

password

157

1234
changeme
abc123
12345
test
123
qwerty

3481
2757
2592
2414
2300
1904
1342

539
421
369
361
311
291
279

1234
12345
1
123
test
root
abc123

125
101
90
89
84
80
70

P@ssw0rd

changeme
test
1234
123
12345
qwerty
admin

597

1102 test123
276
qwerty
68
Table4–Top10passwordsattemptedonthehoneypots


Thetop10passwordsfromeachofthethreehostsdisplaysomesimilarityintheattackapproach.
Passwordsattemptedwereobviouskeyboardpatternsorpatternse.g123456,qwertyandabc123.
Otherpasswordswereaccountnamesthatwouldhaveprivilegedhighlevelaccesssuchasrootand
administrator.Itshouldbenotedthatmanyunsecureddefaultsystemswillhaveforinstanceroot,
root or admin, admin combinations for username and password respectively. The remaining
passwordsdetectedinthetop10werebadchoiceseitherbecauseoflengthorobviousnaturefor
instancechangeme.

Interactionswithhosts
Once attacking entities had gained access to the honeypot a variety of access was evinced from
clearlyautomatedinteractions toobviousmanual probing. Theautomatedinteractions tended to
usescriptsthatendeavouredtodownloadpayloadsfromserversanddeploymaliciouscode.

One of the features of the Kippo honeypot is the false system that allows the attacker to interact
withthehoneypotsystemastheywouldexpecttowhentheyhavecompromisedarealmachineon
the Internet. The fake system provides a limited set of commands within the false machine. Also
falsemachineinformationisfedviastaticfilesrepresentingasystem.Forinstance/proc/cpuinfowill
output realistic details to the attacker. One of the commands available is wget that’s allows the
attackerforinstancetodownloadfilestothecompromisedhost,foroneexample.Thedownloading
filesforcompromisedhostallowsanattackertofurthercompromiseasystemandtrytomaintain
permanentaccesstotheassetstheyhavenowcompromised.

Thefollowingtablerepresentscommandsotherthanfilefetchcommandssuchaswgetandftpthat
weredetectedonceanattackerhadsuccessfullyloggedintothefalsemachine.


Mopoke
ls
w
exit
lsa
cd..
unamea
rmrf.bash_history
echo"WinSCP:thisisendoffile:0"
lsal

110
70
54
43
25
24
24
23
21

Lair
exit
lsal
ls
cat/proc/cpuinfo
cat/etc/issue

3
2
1
1
1

Quokka
ls
cd..
exit
lsal
cd/
lsl
lslah
clear
lsall

chmod+x*
21
ps
Table5Top10commandsexecutedonthehoneypotsonceloggedin

31
14
11
6
4
4
4
3
3
3


Acrossthethreehostsmostofthecommandsweresimplecommandsgatheringbasicintelligence
such as directory listings to search for interesting directories that may contain files of interest. In
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Mopoketherewassomemaliciouscommandusagedetectedfirstlyattemptsweremadetoremove
the .bash_history file, which is a common technique to hide malicious activity of an attacker.
Typically all interactions on a Linux/UNIX based server dialogue to the .bash_history file. It is
interesting to note that the command given rf –r simply deletes the file. This is of note because
deletingandnoterasingwouldallowingforforensicrecoveryofthefile.

The obvious second attempt was when attacking entities tried to modify permissions on files by
making every file executable with the chmod +x * command. Interestingly, on Lair the attacking
entity attempted to gain advanced information through the enumerating /proc/cpuinfo to elicit
machinespecificationwithrespecttoCPUinuse.

Malicioussoftware
Aspreviouslymentionedthesystemallowsfortheuseofwgetandftpcommandstodownloadfiles
typicallymalicious codetothehoneypot. Thisfeatureenablesresearchers tocapturesomeofthe
latestmalcodeavailableontheInternet.Thesystemdownloadsfileintoasandboxenvironmentand
alsologstheinteractions.InthisresearchsofarMopokehad53filesdownloadedofwhich42were
unique.DuringtheperiodmonitoredbothLairandQuokkawerenotcompromisedbyanattacking
agentthatattemptedtodownloadfiles.Thefollowingtable(Table6)isalistofalldownloadedfiles
tothehost,noteifnocountisspecifieditisasingleattempt.

Download

Count

http://www.uniw.com/flood.tar
http://download.microsoft.com/download/win2000platform/S
P/SP3/NT5/ENUS/W2Ksp3.exe

5

http://rapk1d.webs.com/key.pl

2

http://rootarhive.clan.su/scanner/debian.jpg

http://iceagewar.hi2.ro/psyBETA.tgz

2

mariusica.altervista.org/lib.tt

2

http://sacele.ucoz.ro/Mech/Mech.tgz
http://system.comule.com/bnc/psybnclinux
ro.tgz

www.xdutzzux.altervista.org/udp.pl

2

http://tehgame.altervista.org/rk2012.tgz

dinte.webng.com/unic.tgz

http://w0rmer.altervista.org/bot.txt

doiaru.clan.su/clean.tgz

http://wmbro.webs.com/x.tgz

dracdeinger.altervista.org/mm.tgz

linuxtrade.us/

dracdeinger.altervista.org/rk.tgz

LinuxTrade.Us/Arhive/Others/pico.tgz

ftp://mestahost:mestahost2013@188.120.237.29/Smith.tgz

linuxtrade.us/authorized_keys

http://183.60.202.196:521/hello.exe

linuxtrade.us/mech.tgz

http://198.2.192.204:22/disknyp

linuxtrade.us/mh.tgz

http://31.170.164.152/abc/fast.jpg

linuxtrade.us/x.tgz

http://abc.hol.es/abc/fast.pdf

marius.altervista.org/scanner/HaitaTeam.jpg

http://cachefly.cachefly.net/100mb.test

smithboy.webs.com/emech/psybnc.gz

http://d4ng3r.byethost6.com/stuff/FDSK.zip

w0rmer.altervista.org/arhiva.tgz

http://geocities.ws/map/perl.pdf

wbo.clan.su/chx/ssh.gz

http://hackerlinuxmi.clan.su/gosh.tgz

www.parazit.eu/p/psy.tgz

http://pinky.clan.su/sniff/rk.jpg

www.unix.com/flood.tar

http://psybnc.at/download/beta/psyBNC2.3.27.tar.gz

xx.ucoz.com/xx.pdf

http://rapk1d.webs.com/100mb.tgz

zuby.go.ro/boti.tgz

Table6–Listoffilesdownloadedtothehoneypothosts


Itshouldbenotedthatthemultipledownloadsaslistedwerefromactuallydifferentattackinghosts.
Many of the files were variously: rootkits (rk.tgz), denial of service tools (flood.tar), IRC tools
(psyBNC) and compromise replacement binaries (ssh.gz). There was also PDF and JPG files that
contained malicious payload principally targeted at the Microsoft Windows platform. The
predominanceoffiletransferswerealsoattemptedbyhttpwithonlyonespecificallytargetingftpas
thetransportprotocolftp://mestahost:mestahost2013@188.120.237.29/Smith.tgz
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DISCUSSIONANDCONCLUSION
Thehoneypotsystemshavedetectedawiderangeofmalfeasancebyattackingentities.However,
there are significant incongruities with some of the commonly held views or opinions which are
frequentlystatedasfactinrelationtoscanningandprobingofinternetfacinghosts.Theresultsof
thisresearchhaveprovidedevidencetorefutesomeoftheseclaims.

Thefirst misconceptionisthat thereiswidespread automatedscanningoftheInternetbybotsor
automatedscriptstypicallyinitiatedbyahumanbeingacrossentirenetwork blocks.Theevidence
acquired by this research to this point would indicate that this is not the case for the majority of
attacks.Thesethreeidenticalhostswereonthesamesubnetworkwithvaryinglevelsofprobingand
attack. If there was widespread scanning one would postulate that the top 10 or even top 20
attackingIPsforsuchalongitudinalstudywouldbethesameorexhibithighsimilarity,thishasnot
been the case. However, there are only 4 or 11% of hosts that did scan all three hosts that
terminated their connection once a particular limit had been reached, which does indicate some
automatedscanningdidoccur.

Thesecondmisconceptionisthatmanyofthetechniquesareadvancedandthatthemaliciouscode
is likewise advanced. Some of the behaviours exhibited in this research would indicate that the
attacks are at least persistent but certainly calls into question their advanced nature. There is
however, a word of caution in that these machines were Linux based and not Windowsbased
machines which are attacked more often. In the downloaded code there was numerous payloads
detectedthatspecificallytargetedWindowsbasedsystemshowever,usingRumsfeldianlogicthese
were “known knowns”. The “known knowns” would have been readily detected by any base level
antivirussoftwarewithanuptodatesignaturebase.Thisfindingalsoaddsweighttotheargument
thatattacksarenotsophisticatedinorientation.

Inconclusion,thisisapreliminaryanalysisofanextensivedatasetproducedbythreehoneypotsin
over just 75 days. The analysis of the data at this stage has been limited to analysing high level
loggingdatarecordedbythehoneypotswithsomeindepthanalysiswhererequired.Therehasnot
been an extensive forensic review of log files and other data that was collected in the honeypot
systems at this stage. This data will need further research and development of suitable analysis
techniquesandmethods.Finally,thehoneypotsarestillcollectingdatafromattackersandattimeof
writing had a combined database approaching 1 million attempts, which will require novel
techniquesforlongitudinalanalysis.
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